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THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER AND
THE QUESTION OF SCALE
RICHARD BRIFFAULT*

A central issue for the New York City Charter-from the consolidation
of Greater New York City a century ago until today-has been the question
of scale. Or perhaps I should say the questions of scale. There really have

been two questions: Is New York City large enough to deal with problems
of regional scope? Does New York City have the necessary mechanisms to
deal with problems that are of sublocal scope? In other words, can the City
of New York provide both the regional and local governance New Yorkers
need?
The creation of Greater New York was driven largely by regional
concerns. Greater New York was established to create one government
large enough to deal with the regional issues of economic development,
land improvement, infrastructure finance, port and harbor development,
and transportation.' Greater New York was to provide a regional
government that matched the regional scale of the area's economy and
pattern of development. 2 Greater New York did not include the entire New
York region. Given the constraints of federalism, the inclusion of the
communities on the New Jersey side of the Hudson River was never a
serious possibility. But the consolidated city was of substantial territorial
scope, including farms, open space, countryside, and villages, as well as
the principal cities of the region.3
As a regional government, Greater New York had considerable
success. Consolidation was followed by the rapid development of the Bronx
and Queens, and the construction of new physical infrastructure and
improvements, including streets, sidewalks, electric lighting, and rapid
transit. The crushing density of population in lower Manhattan was

* Richard Briffault, Vice Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation,
Columbia Law School.
1. See Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance:
The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local SelfDetermination, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 780 (1992); see also WALLACE S. SAYRE &
HERBERT KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY: POLITICS IN THE METROPOLIS 11
(W.W. Norton & Co. 1965) (1960).
2. See SAYRE &KAUFMAN, supra note 1, at 19-20 (explaining how New York became
the primary transportation center for the exchange of raw materials which contributed to its
huge economic growth).
3. See id. at 29.
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relieved by the development of upper Manhattan and the outer boroughs. 4
For the next fifty years, much of New York City's "suburban" growth
occurred within the city's boundaries. Brooklyn grew by 135 %, peaking
at 2.3 million people in 1950. 5 The Bronx grew by an astronomical 625 %
to 1.5 million people in 1950.6 Queens exploded by 1200 percent, before
finally peaking at 2 million people in 1970.' Staten Island, which had just
67,000 people at the turn of the century, is still growing as it approaches
a population of 400,000.8 Thus, as a result of consolidation, the city
retained a considerable portion of the tax base resulting from economic and
demographic growth within its boundaries.
Even today, due to consolidation, New York City looms larger in its
metropolitan area than any other major Northern or Eastern city in its
respective metropolitan area. New York City accounts for 37% of the
population of its Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area
("CMSA")-compared to 33 % for Chicago's share of its CMSA, 26% for
Philadelphia, 20 % for Detroit, 18 % for Cleveland, 16 % for St. Louis, and
10.5% for Boston.9 New York City's importance in its region is even
more sharply reflected in data comparing the population of a central city to
that of its Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area ("PMSA")-the core of the
metropolitan area. In 1990, New York City had approximately 87% of the
population of the New York PMSA, compared to Chicago's 38%,
Philadelphia's 32 %, Detroit's 24 %, Cleveland's 23 %, and Boston's 18 %.1"
Similarly, as a result of consolidation, New York City plays an unusually
large role in its state. No other major city constitutes nearly as high of a
percentage of state population, employment, or personal income."'
Yet, it is clear that with the expansion of the region and the dispersal
of population and jobs to previously outlying areas, Greater New York is
no longer a regional government. Indeed, the New York City area has no
effective regional government. To some extent, a true regional government

4. See SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 1, at 18 (demonstrating that the Bronx
increased from about 89,000 by 1890 to 200,000 by 1900; Brooklyn increased from
838,000 to over 1,160,000; and Queens increased from 87,000 to 153,000).
5. See DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 18 (1993).
6. See id.

7. See id.
8. See RUSK, supra note 5, at 18; see also SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 1, at 18.
9. See U.S. BUREAU OFTHE CENSUS, STATISTICALABSTRACTOFTHE UNITED STATES:
1997, at 41-47 (ll7th ed. 1997).
10. See id.
11. See James C. Musselwhite, Jr., A Comparative View, in THE TWO NEW YORKS:
STATE-CITY RELATIONS INTHE CHANGING FEDERAL SYSTEM 25, 31 (Gerald Benjamin &
Charles Brecher eds., 1988); see also Matthew P. Drennan, The Economy, in THE TWO
NEW YORKS: STATE-CITY RELATIONS INTHE CHANGING FEDERAL SYSTEM 55, 70

Benjamin & Charles Brecher eds., 1988).
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was never really possible in an area bisected by an interstate boundary-an
area that now sprawls across New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.
The American federal system limits the ability to create a local government
that crosses state lines. Even on the New York side of the line, the steady
movement of population and employment from the city to the suburbs has
limited New York City's ability: to reap the benefits of economic growth,
to provide regional transportation structures or land use planning, to
undertake regional environmental initiatives, or to provide assistance to the
poor. The tri-state area is a regional economic unit, engaged in a global
competition with comparable regional economic units. It lacks, however,
a regional political structure capable of effective action on behalf of the
whole region.13 Instead, regional initiatives are too often held hostage to
local and interstate conflicts and competition.
In this regard, the New York City area is typical of other metropolitan
regions in the United States. There is no region in the United States with
an effective metropolitan government coextensive with the region.' 4 The
1898 consolidation makes New York stronger than other Northern and
Eastern cities-but it still does not have a regional government.
The question of the regional scope of Greater New York is, of course,
beyond the city level's control. It cannot be determined simply by a
revision of the Charter. Although the city may be given a voice, the matter
really is one for state and national resolution.
The next question concerns sublocal government: what sort of
neighborhood, community, or subcity government should be used to
address neighborhood concerns. This matter has been addressed by the
City Charter and its revisions. As consolidation sought to create a
government capable of dealing with regional issues, the first Charter sought
to provide a mechanism for dealing with smaller, "local" matters, that did
not effect the entire city.' 5 A central focus of the 1897 Charter-along with
the 1901, 1936, 1961, 1975, and 1989 Charters-was the relationship
between the city and subcity units.' 6 The Charter drafters had to determine
what powers could be given to smaller units and what powers must be held
by the central city government. They have also had to consider what role
subcity units ought to have in the central government. City-subcity relations

12. See Musselwhite, supra note 11, at 29.
13. See generally ROBERT D. YARO & TONY

Hiss, A REGION AT RISK: THE THIRD
REGIONAL PLAN FOR THE NEW YORK-NEW JERSEY-CONNECTICUT METROPOLITAN AREA

(1996).
14. See RUSK, supra note 5, at 89, 95.
15.

See SAYRE&KAUFMAN, supra note 1, at 14-17.

16. See id.
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have, surely, not been the sole focus of Charter revision, but subcity
governance has been a consistent theme in the Charter revision process.
The 1897 Charter invented the idea of the borough. 8 The Bronx was
created out of the portion of preconsolidated New York located on the
mainland of the United States. The borough of Queens was created out of
Long Island City and the villages and unincorporated land in the western
portion of Queens County. The former City of Brooklyn, the island of
Manhattan, and Richmond County became boroughs as well.' 9
In the 1897 Charter, the boroughs, headed by borough presidents, were
given the limited responsibilities of mapping their territories and initiating
local improvements, subject to the approval of the Municipal Assembly.
Borough presidents, however, had no power to actually undertake the
improvements. Their function was essentially advisory."
In 1901, the Charter took a sharp move in the direction of greater
borough power.2' Indeed, much of what we assume about the structure of
city-borough relations in the years following consolidation was really a
product of the 1901 revision and not the original 1897 Charter.22 The
borough presidents were given seats on the Board of Estimate, which
previously consisted solely of citywide elected and appointed officials. The
five borough presidents were given a total of seven votes-the presidents
of Manhattan and Brooklyn had two votes apiece while the other presidents
each had just one vote-and the citywide officials had a total of sixteen
votes. The 1901 Charter also gave the borough presidents seats on the
Board of Aldermen. Moreover, the borough presidents were given
operational responsibilities over streets, sewers, and public buildings within
their boroughs. Under the 1901 Charter, they could actually undertake
public improvements. Compared to the 1897 Charter, the 1901 Charter
represented considerable decentralization of city government.2
In 1936, the pendulum swung back. The borough presidents lost most
of their powers over public works, which shifted to the new Department of
City Planning and to the City Planning Commission.24 With the abolition

17. See id.
18. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, BRIEFING BOOK
1988) [hereinafter BRIEFING BOOK].
19. See id.
20. See id. at II-D-16 to I-D-18.
21. See id. at II-D-18.
22. See id. at II-D-18 to II-D-19.

11-D-15 (Jan. 12,

23. See id.; see also Joseph P. Viteritti, The Traditionof Municipal Reform: Charter
Revision in HistoricalContext, in RESTRUCTURINGTHENEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE
REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL REFORM 22-24 (Frank J. Mauro & Gerald Benjamin eds.,
1989).
24. See BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 18, at II-D-19 to II-D-20.
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of the Board of Aldermen, the borough presidents lost their seats in the
City's legislative body.'
In 1961, the borough presidents lost their
remaining independent powers over streets, highways, and sewers.2 6 From
1961 to 1989, the power of the borough presidents grew out of their seats
on the Board of Estimate, where they cast five votes to the citywide
officials' six.27 In 1989, of course, they lost the Board of Estimate as well.
Today, the borough presidents have relatively few formal powers. They
can make appointments to the Board of Education-a power they have due
to state law, not the City Charter. 28 They can make appointments to the
City Planning Commission. 29 They can make recommendations with
respect to increments in the capital budget.30 They participate in the
ULURP-the Uniform Land Use Review Process-and may make
recommendations concerning proposed land use changes in their respective
boroughs. 31 But their principal power is informal and political, rather than
formal and legal. They have a bully pulpit that gives them the opportunity
to use their titles and their positions as representatives of large subcity
constituencies and to speak out on issues of concern to them and their
constituents. But there is little they can actually do.
The boroughs are not the sole, or even the principal, focus of subcity
governance. Given the large size of the boroughs, it is not clear how much
decentralization of service-delivery or how much of an opportunity for
grassroots citizen participation in governance even empowered borough
governments could provide. Two of the five boroughs have populations of
two million apiece; two other boroughs have more than a million people
each. Even Staten Island is as large as Pittsburgh and larger than Buffalo.
In any place but New York, the boroughs would be full-sized city
governments.
Therefore, in New York City, meaningful subcity
governance requires the creation of units that are smaller than the
boroughs.

25. See id.
26. See id. at II-D-20 to II-D-21; see also Viteritti, supra note 23, at 26-27.
27. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 790-91.
28. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-b (McKinney 1997).
29. SeeN.Y. CITY CHARTERch. 8 § 192 (1989) (each borough president shall appoint
one member of the City Planning Commission; the mayor may appoint the chair and six
other members; the president of the Council shall appoint one member).
30.

See id. ch. 4 § 82; ch. 9 § 211.

31. See id. ch. 8 § 197-c. Borough presidents may also propose plans for the
development, growth and improvement of land within their respective boroughs. To take
effect, however, such plans must be submitted to, and approved by, the City Planning
Commission, and then they must be submitted to review, and possibly disapproved, by the
City Council. See id. ch. 8 §§ 197-c, 197-d.
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The 1961 Charter revision sought to address this concern through the
creation of community districts and community boards. 32 The fifty-nine
community districts vary considerably in size, but most have about 125,000
residents and come much closer to the neighborhood or community scale
than do the boroughs. The community boards have relatively limited
powers. They can make non-binding recommendations concerning
proposed land use changes within their boundaries, and concerning city
services and the city budget.33 Community board members are appointed,
not elected, 34 which limits their ability to speak as representatives of
community residents.
Moreover, they have very limited budget
resources, 35 which constrain their ability to analyze proposals and make
recommendations.
As advisory bodies, community boards have had some influence on
land use decisions, especially at the margins. But their success is variable
and reflects the abilities of different community boards to tap into differing
community political resources.36
There are other forms of sublocal governance. Community school
boards are elected and have some control over public school resources.37
The community school boards have been controversial. They may be able
to articulate community viewpoints, 3 but it is not clear whether they have
had any positive impact on public education. This is due in part to the
limits on their powers to determine educational policy, and in part to their
failures to use effectively the powers they do enjoy-failures that led to the
state's recent curtailment of school board autonomy. 3 9
New York City also has forty business improvement districts
("BIDs").40 Some of these have been quite successful in providing
services, including sanitation, policing economic development, and in

32.

See BRIEFING

BOOK,

supra note 18, at II-D-22. The community districts are

codified at chapters 69 and 70 of the current City Charter.
33.

See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 70 § 2800 (1989).

34. See id.
35. See, e.g., Ray Bromley, Globalization and the Inner Periphery:A Mid-Bronx
View, 551 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC., 191, 193 (1997) (describing the lowincome constituency of Bronx Community Board 6).
36. See Robert F. Pecorella, Community Governance: A Decade of Experience, in
RESTRUCTURING THE NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL

REFORM 97-109 (Frank J. Mauro & Gerald Benjamin eds., 1989).
37. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-c(2) (McKinney 1997).
38. See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, 3 Community School Boards Resist Mandatory
Uniforms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1998, at B3.
39. See 1996 N.Y. Laws 720.
40. See generally N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980 (McKinney 1997).
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financing physical improvements." But BIDs have also proven to be
controversial. 42 They are elected by property owners rather than by
community residents, and their dependence on district-based resources
limits their usefulness as models of neighborhood governance outside of
commercial districts.43 Moreover, questions have been raised concerning
the accountability of BIDs even to their business and commercial
constituents.44
There is also the City Council. With fifty-one districts, 45 and district
constituencies of approximately 150,000 people, the Council provides an
opportunity for subcity voices to be heard in city government through their
council members. 46 However, as a result of the "one person-one vote"
doctrine and the requirement of decennial population-based
reapportionment, council districts cannot be drawn exclusively along
community or neighborhood lines. 47 Smaller neighborhoods may not get
their own council member, and larger communities may sprawl across
multiple districts. Moreover, although a central thrust of the 1989 Charter
revision was to increase both the power and representativeness of the
Council, it is not clear whether even a stronger and expanded Council can
be said to provide an opportunity for community-level participation and
neighborhood decision-making concerning neighborhood conditions and
services.
In short, although we can bring about community governance by
amending our Charter, it is not clear whether we really want such
governance, or whether we know what we ought to do. If we look at the
history, there has never been any real governing power exercised at the
community level. Recent years have witnessed the limited rise of
community boards and BIDs, and the rise and partial fall of the community
school boards, but at no time has substantial authority been delegated to
sublocal governments.

41.

See Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82
503, 517 (1997).
42. See David J..Kennedy, Restrainingthe Power ofBusiness Improvement Districts:
The Case ofthe Grand CentralPartnership,15 YALEL. &POL'Y REV. 283,289-94 (1996).
MINN. L. REV.

43.

See id. at 289, 294.

44. See, e.g.,

THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

MANAGING THE

MICROPOLIS: PROPOSALS TO STRENGTHEN BID PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY (Staff

Report to the Committee on Finance, Nov. 12, 1997); THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, CITIES WITHIN CITIES: BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS AND THE EMERGENCE

Committee on Finance, Nov. 15, 1995).
45. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 22 (1989).

OF THE MICROPOLIS (Staff Report to the

46. See Briffault supra note 41, at 503.

47. See Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local
Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 403-04 (1993).
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If we did really value subcity governance, how would we go about
creating it? We would have to grapple with several significant problems.
First, subcity governments would need to have real powers-not just the
power to give advice, but the power to take action. This would be
necessary if only to draw the attention of people who might want to get
involved in them by running for community-level office and participating
in community affairs. Significant grass-roots participation would require
real grass-roots power.
Second, these governments would need adequate financial resources.
Funds are necessary to study land use and service-delivery questions, to
engage in advocacy of community interests, and to provide services. The
successes of BIDs are closely tied to the existence of district-based
assessments that fund BID activities; in contrast, community boards have
been limited by their lack of financial resources.48
Third, we would have to deal with the potential for community-city
conflict. More powerful community-based governments would certainly
add to the already protracted process of approving certain contracts and
zoning changes, and would probably make it more difficult for the city
government to take action. Indeed, community governments might seek to
block land use developments or service terminations that the city proposes.
When do we want to require the city to give way in the face of community
opposition? Right now, the city may have to solicit and listen to community
input, but it is not bound by community positions. The hardest issue in
thinking about sublocal governance may be the determination of when, if
ever, the sublocal government ought to prevail in cases of city-sublocal
conflict.
Finally, there is the question of the accountability of sublocal
governments to the people they are supposed to represent and serve. The
goal of sublocal governments-whether borough, community, or
neighborhood-is to assure the existence of public structures more
responsive to the different concerns of people in different areas of the city.
This assumes that smaller, sublocal governments will be more accountable
to their constituents than is the city government. But the Achilles' heel of
community government may be the question of accountability. Community
governments are supposed to be closer to the grass roots-closer to the
people-but in fact there tends to be relatively little direct community
involvement in most community-based governments. Community political
structures have relatively little visibility, and they are relatively poorly
monitored even by people in their communities.49 Of course, community
institutions presently have relatively little power. But the need for effective

48.
49.

See Kennedy, supra note 42, at 291-92.
See id.
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community monitoring and control of community governing institutions
would grow if these institutions were given power and resources.
This is the paradox: one goal of community governance is to strengthen
communities, but community government is not likely to be accountable to
community residents unless there are already other community
institutions-such as community-based newspapers or other communityoriented media, or community social or civic organizations-that can
monitor the performance of community governments. One of the problems
in New York is the lack of strong community-based institutions.
Community government could help to build communities and stimulate the
growth of community-oriented media and community civic organizations,
but community government also requires that some of these community
institutions already exist in order to assure community government
accountability. Community government and community institutions need
each other if they are to succeed.
If the past is any indication, the question of scale, and especially of
city-community relations, is likely to be an issue in any future Charter
revision. History also indicates that developing effective and accountable
subcity governance structures and resolving city-subcity conflicts will be
a significant challenge to future Charter revisers.

